Martin Nybom
Jan Stuhler
Mattia Fochesato
Sam Bowles
Linda Wu
Tzu-Ting Yang
Thomas Piketty
Malka Guillot
Jonathan Goupille-Lebret
Bertrand Garbinti
Antoine Bozio
Hakki Yazici
Slavík Ctirad
Kina Özlem
Tilman Graff
Tilman Graff
Yuri Ostrovsky
Martin Munk
Anton Heil
Maitreesh Ghatak
Robin Burgess
Oriana Bandiera
Claire Balboni
Jonna Olsson
Richard Foltyn
Minjie Deng
Iiyana Kuziemko
Elisa Jácome
Juan Pablo Rud
Bridget Hofmann
Sumaiya Rahman
Martin Nybom
Stephen Machin
Hans van Kippersluis
Anne C. Gielen
Espen Bratberg
Jo Blanden
Adrian Adermon
Maximilian Hell
Robert Manduca
Robert Manduca
Marta Morazzoni
Aadesh Gupta
David Wengrow
Damian Phelan
Amanda Dahlstrand
Andrea Guariso
Erika Deserranno
Lukas Hensel
Stefano Caria
Vrinda Mittal
Ararat Gocmen
Clara Martínez-Toledano
Yves Steinebach
Breno Sampaio
Joana Naritomi
Diogo Britto
François Gerard
Filippo Pallotti
Heather Sarsons
Kristóf Madarász
Anna Becker
Lucas Conwell
Michela Carlana
Katja Seim
Joao Granja
Jason Sockin
Todd Schoellman
Paolo Martellini
UCL Policy Lab
Natalia Ramondo
Javier Cravino
Vanessa Alviarez
Hugo Reis
Pedro Carneiro
Raul Santaeulalia-Llopis
Diego Restuccia
Chaoran Chen
Brad J. Hershbein
Claudia Macaluso
Chen Yeh
Xuan Tam
Xin Tang
Marina M. Tavares
Adrian Peralta-Alva
Carlos Carillo-Tudela
Felix Koenig
Joze Sambt
Ronald Lee
James Sefton
David McCarthy
Bledi Taska
Carter Braxton
Alp Simsek
Plamen T. Nenov
Gabriel Chodorow-Reich
Virgiliu Midrigan
Corina Boar
Sauro Mocetti
Guglielmo Barone
Steven J. Davis
Nicholas Bloom
José María Barrero
Thomas Sampson
Adrien Matray
Natalie Bau
Darryl Koehler
Laurence J. Kotlikoff
Alan J. Auerbach
Irina Popova
Alexander Ludwig
Dirk Krueger
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Taylor Jaworski
Walker Hanlon
Ludo Visschers
Henrik Kleven
Kristian Jakobsen
Katrine Marie Jakobsen
Alessandro Guarnieri
Tanguy van Ypersele
Fabien Petit
Cecilia García-Peñalosa
Yonatan Berman
Nina Weber
Julian Limberg
David Hope
Pedro Tremacoldi-Rossi
Tatiana Mocanu
Marco Ranaldi
Silvia Vannutelli
Raymond Fisman
John Voorheis
Reed Walker
Janet Currie
Roel Dom
Marcos Vera-Hernández
Emla Fitzsimons
José V. Rodríguez Mora
Tomasa Rodrigo
Álvaro Ortiz
Stephen Hansen
Vasco Carvalho
Gergely Buda
Gabriel Zucman
Anders Jensen
Matthew Fisher-Post
José-Alberto Guerra
Myra Mohnen
Christopher Timmins
Ignacio Sarmiento-Barbieri
Peter Christensen
Linda Wu
Gaurav Khatri
Julián Costas-Fernández
Eleonora Patacchini
Jorgen Harris
Marco Battaglini
Ricardo Fernholz
Alberto Bisin
Jess Benhabib
Cian Ruane
Pete Klenow
Mark Bils
Peter Hull
Will Dobbie
David Arnold
Eric Zwick
Owen Zidar
Matt Smith
Ansgar Walther
Tarun Ramadorai
Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham
Andreas Fuster
Ellora Derenoncourt
Golvine de Rochambeau
Vinayak Iyer
Jonas Hjort
Elena Simintzi
Paige Ouimet
Holger Mueller
Pablo Garriga
Gabriel Ulyssea
Costas Meghir
Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg
Rafael Dix-Carneiro
Alessandro Toppeta
Áureo de Paula
Orazio Attanasio
Seth Zimmerman
Joseph Price
Valerie Michelman
Camille Semelet
Anne Brockmeyer
Pierre Bachas
Santiago Pérez
Elisa Jácome
Leah Boustan
Ran Abramitzky
Jesse Rothstein

Can you move to opportunity? Evidence from the Great Migration

What is this research about and why did you do it?

U.S. history is rife with examples of groups and individuals migrating in search of better opportunities for themselves and their descendants. Research on these events has focused on whether moving increases the migrants’ socioeconomic mobility, but I was more concerned with studying the general equilibrium effects of such moves. In other words, if disadvantaged groups move to better neighborhoods at scale, does this affect opportunity in those neighborhoods for future generations? I sought to answer this question by studying the largest natural experiment in moving to opportunity in US history: the Great Migration – when 6 million southern African Americans migrated North between 1916 and 1970 to escape racial prejudice and a lack of economic opportunity in the US South.  

How did you answer this question?  

To disentangle the effect of changing racial composition on mobility from confounding factors like deindustrialization, which affected some of the same destination locations, I use a shift-share instrument that isolates quasi-random variation in Black in-migration to cities. This empirical strategy makes use of two idiosyncrasies of southern Black migration. First, I use the fact that Black southern migrants settled in northern cities where previous migrants from their communities had moved, giving rise to highly specific linkages between southern locations and northern destinations. Second, I combine information on pre-1940 Black southern migrants’ location choices with supply-side variation in Black outmigration from southern counties from 1940-1970, predicted using a machine learning algorithm applied to southern economic variables alone. I combine this empirical strategy with data on contemporary upward mobility in former Great Migration cities and with a database I built of neighborhood quality and local public investments for destinations over the 2

What did you find?

My results show that the gains from growing up in the North for Black children vanished after the Great Migration. I find that a 1-standard-deviation increase in historical Black migration is associated with an 11% reduction in adult income. The incidence of these reductions falls entirely on Black boys growing up in destination locations today. When I investigated the reasons for declines in Black mobility in former Great Migration cities, two main mechanisms stood out: white flight to suburbs and out of shared public schools and local policy makers responding to urban decline with increased investment in policing and incarceration. In total, I find that reactions to the Great Migration accounts for roughly 27% of the gap in upward mobility between Black and white households in the region.  

This figure depicts the relationship between average upward mobility for individuals with low income parents in the 2000s and the percentile of Black population increase during the Great Migration (1940 to 1970) for northern commuting zones (CZs). Each observation is a CZ. The percentile of Black population change is grouped into 20 bins of 5 percentiles each. Upward mobility is defined here as the average household income rank for individuals with parents at the 25 th percentile of the parent income distribution. Income is measured using the IRS tax returns of cohorts and the parents of cohorts born between 1980 and 1986. Data sources: IPUMS complete count 1940 US census; City and County Data Books; Chetty, Hendren, Jones, and Porter (2020).

What implications does this have for the research on wealth concentration or economic inequality?

Although the children and grandchildren of Black migrants benefited from growing up in higher income families, backlash to the northern Great Migration removed the ladder of opportunity for Black families living outside the South. Reversing the effects of these decades of public policy negligence requires more than today’s solutions of housing lotteries or initiatives that affect a small handful of families given the opportunity to leave their neighborhoods. Instead, it is imperative that policymakers also commit to raising people up and supporting communities where they are. We owe at least that much to the millions of Black Americans who dared travelled North in search of better opportunities.

What are the next steps in your agenda?  

My ongoing work in this agenda involves documenting the causal role of the Great Migration in the punitive turn of local criminal justice policy in the US. With a team of researchers, we are collecting historical misdemeanour laws and constructing measures of local criminal court jurisdiction severity to test the role of racial composition change on the punitiveness of local policy.

Citation and related resources

This paper can be cited as follows: Derenoncourt, E. (2022) "Can you move to opportunity? Evidence from the Great Migration." American Economic Review, 112(2), pp. 369-408.

About the authors

Ellora Derenoncourt