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Technical change that extends market scale can generate winner-take-all dynamics, with large income growth among top earners. I test this "superstar model" in the entertainer labor market, where the historic rollout of television creates a natural experiment in scale-related technological change. The resulting inequality changes are consistent with superstar theory: the launch of a local TV station skews the entertainer wage distribution sharply to the right, with the biggest impact at the very top of the distribution, while negatively impacting workers below the star level. The findings provide evidence of superstar effects and distinguish such effects from popular alternative models.

My work will highlight how urban markets, such as housing or transport, respond to government investment and evolve with development. Understanding the mechanisms involved will then inform crucial policy questions. Should governments, particularly in developing countries, optimize existing ‘technologies’ serving the urban lower-income masses – such as shared minibuses or informal settlements – or invest in the formal housing or transit infrastructure?

We examine intergenerational mobility in the very long run, across generations that are six centuries apart. We exploit a unique dataset containing detailed information at the individual level for all people living in the Italian city of Florence in 1427. These individuals have been associated, using their surnames, with their pseudo-descendants living in Florence in 2011. We find that long-run earnings elasticity is about 0.04; we also find an even stronger role for real wealth inheritance and evidence of persistence in belonging to certain elite occupations. Our results are confirmed when we account for the quality of the pseudo-links and when we address the potential selectivity bias behind the matching process. Finally, we frame our results within the existing evidence and argue that the quasi-immobility of preindustrial society and the existence of multigenerational effects might explain the long-lasting effects of ancestors’ socioeconomic status.

We study optimal capital income and wealth taxation in an economy that reproduces the importance of private businesses for output and inequality. If entrepreneurs are subject to collateral constraints, they face heterogeneous rates of return, which generate a meaningful distinction between capital income and wealth taxation. We find that taxing capital income is preferable to taxing wealth because the efficiency gains from wealth taxation are swamped by the redistributional benefits of taxing the profits of richer entrepreneurs. Consequently, the gains from taxing wealth are modest. This conclusion is robust to the planner's preference for redistribution and allowing for nonlinear taxes.

We use detailed data on stock portfolios of Norwegian households to show that stock market wealth increases entrepreneurship activity. Our research design isolates idiosyncratic, quasi-random variation in stock market returns. An increase in stock market wealth increases the propensity to start a firm, with the response concentrated in households with moderate levels of financial wealth, for whom a 20 percent increase in stock wealth increases the likelihood to start a firm by about 20%, and in years when the aggregate stock market return in Norway is high. We develop a method to study the effect of wealth on firm outcomes that corrects for the bias introduced by selection into entrepreneurship. An increase in stock market wealth also has a causal effect on initial firm size and profitability. The pass-through from stock wealth into equity in the new firm is one-for-one, indicating that higher stock market wealth relaxes would-be entrepreneurs' financial constraints.

We examine the role of technological change in explaining the large and persistent decline in earnings following job loss. Using detailed skill requirements from the near universe of online vacancies, we estimate technological change by occupation and find that technological change accounts for 45 percent of the decline in earnings after job loss. Technological change lowers earnings after job loss by requiring workers to have new skills to perform newly created jobs in their prior occupation. When workers lack the required skills, they move to occupations where their skills are still employable but are paid a lower wage.

We will investigate how individuals' self-image and self-stereotypes may prevent access to educational opportunities, leading to a perpetuation of income segregation. We will investigate self-stereotypes in the context of a preferential university admission policy in Chile targeted at disadvantaged students (PACE), which recent work has shown to suffer from low take-up.

Can strengthening intellectual property protection for producers of one good affect innovation in other related goods? To answer this question, we exploit a unique policy experiment in the interwar military aircraft industry. Airframe designs had little intellectual property protection before 1926, but changes passed by Congress in 1926 provided airframe manufacturers with enhanced property rights over new designs. We show that granting property rights to airframe producers increased innovation in airframes, but slowed innovation in aero-engines, a complementary good where there was no change in the availability of intellectual property protection. We propose and test a simple theory that explains these patterns.

Using a structural life-cycle model, we quantify the heterogeneous impact of school closures during the corona crisis on children affected at different ages and coming from households with different parental characteristics. In the model, public investment through schooling is combined with parental time and resource investments in the production of child human capital at different stages in the children’s development process. We quantitatively characterise the long-term consequences from a COVID-19-induced loss of schooling, and find average losses in the present discounted value of lifetime earnings of the affected children of ⁠, as well as welfare losses equivalent to about of permanent consumption. Because of self-productivity in the human capital production function, younger children are hurt more by the school closures than older children. The negative impact of the crisis on children’s welfare is especially severe for those with parents with low educational attainment and low assets.

This study measures spending power inequality within age cohorts and estimates fiscal progressivity via lifetime net tax rates. We find, first, that inequality in income and especially wealth dramatically overstates inequality in spending power. Second, inequality in current spending power differs from that in lifetime spending power because of credit constraints, in-kind government benefits, and other factors. Third, the US fiscal system is highly progressive once cohorts are old enough to have highly dispersed human wealth. Fourth, households’ rankings based on current income can differ substantially from their rankings based on lifetime resources. Fifth, current-year net tax rates substantially understate fiscal progressivity.